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Models on how perceptual and cognitive information on others’ mental states are treated by the cognitive
architecture are often framed as duplex models considering two independent systems. In the context of the
neuroscience of empathy analogous systems have been described. Using event-related potentials (i.e., ERPs)
technique, we tested the hypothesis of temporal dissociation of two functional systems. We implemented a
design in which perceptual (i.e., painful or neutral facial expressions) and contextual (i.e., painful or neutral
related sentences) cues on others’ mental states were orthogonally manipulated. Painful expressions
selectively modulated the early activity at 110–360 ms over fronto-central and centro-parietal regions,
whereas painful contexts selectively modulated the late activity at 400–840 ms over these same regions.
Notably, the reactions to pain triggered by these cues added up when both were available, that is the joint
reaction was characterized by additive effects. These findings favor a model assuming distinct neural paths
of perceptual and cognitive processing, at least when the cognitive component is triggered by language.
T
he social environment is a source of copious multimodal information regarding others’ sensations, feelings,
beliefs and desires. Others’ physical actions and facial/body expressions can be directly perceived, whereas a
different source of information is contextually established and not directly observable, for instance when it is
conveyed by language. Under appropriate circumstances, both perceptual and verbal information may trigger an
empathic reaction in an observer, like when witnessing other’s physical injury or hearing/reading about a sad
event. The present investigation provides the first evidence of a double dissociation at both temporal and
functional levels in the processing of perceptual and verbal information on others’ pain by showing that each
is separately processed in the brain even when both types of information are concurrently available.
Most of the theoretical views on how perceptual and verbal information on others’ mental states is treated by
the cognitive architecture are indeed framed as duplex models considering two levels, or systems, that operate
according to different rules and modes of processing. The philosopher Goldman1,2 distinguishes, for instance,
low-level mindreading 2 which is characterized as a simple, primitive, automatic, and largely below the level of
consciousness mechanism dedicated to the processing of social perceptual information 2 from high-level mind-
reading 2 as committed to understand someone else’s mental states by pretending his/her beliefs and desires.
This distinction fits well with that of Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan3, which refer to analogous levels termed social-
perceptual and social-cognitive components of theory of mind (i.e., ToM). Both of these models belong to a rich
tradition of theoretical frameworks that view the human mind as dual4–7 and intend to explain thinking, reason-
ing, decision making and also social cognition as based on the operation of, at least, two systems 2 often named
System 1 and System 22 characterized in a very similar way across the different models. Specifically, System 1
operates quickly, unconsciously and in an automatic fashion, whereas System 2 is slow, rule-based, deliberative,
conscious and flexible6. To note, duplex models have been recently criticized8–10, mostly because of the lack of
empirical testing and rigorous conceptual clarity; in general, these critics agree that ‘‘evidence used to support
dual theories is consistent with single-system accounts’’8 as well.
In the context of empathy for pain two systems similar to those theorized by Goldman1,2 and Tager-Flusberg
and Sullivan3 have been proposed, with experience sharing on one side (vicariously sharing others’ internal states)
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and mentalizing on the other side (explicitly considering others’
states)11. Notably, this functional distinction in the context of
empathy for pain, is also shaped at the neuroanatomical level (i.e.,
neuropsychological dissociation) with experience sharing engaging
the mirror neuron and the limbic systems (in particular the inferior
frontal gyrus and the anterior insula)13–17,20–21 and mentalizing enga-
ging a subset of regions within medial prefrontal and temporal
cortices and precuneus12,14,16,18–21. According to Schacter and
Tulving22, this convergence of dissociations corroborates the view
that the two alleged systems are in fact separable. However, appar-
ently in contrast to this evidence, there is also indication based on
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies that pain
related pictures and pain related words activate the same core
empathic neural network, i.e., the secondary somatosensory cortex
(i.e., SII), the insula, the right middle frontal gyrus, the left superior
temporal sulcus and the left middle occipital gyrus23; furthermore,
previous functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) work
reported the co-activation of the two systems during social inter-
action, actions and emotion understanding24–28.
At the present, the evidence mentioned above does not clearly
support temporal and functional dissociations between the two
alleged systems, such that modulatory effects of one system on the
other remain possible, and perhaps plausible. The issue of possible
interactions between the two systems is at the present more than ever
crucial in the field11,27–32 and a critical aspect related to this debate is
very well portrayed by Gonzalez-Liencres, Shamay-Tsoory and
Bru¨ne’s question in their recent review (2013; p. 1543): ‘‘[…] do
we first perceive the pain in others (unconsciously) and then process
the context (consciously), or is contextual information relevant for
the unconscious evaluation of another’s pain?’’. Intuitively, one
would expect that, when provided with proper and coherent contex-
tually defined semantic information, reactions to physical signs of
others’ pain would get enhanced. Importantly, answering this ques-
tion is relevant not only to studies on empathy, but encompasses
social cognition conceptualizations as well.
Although the excellent spatial resolution of fMRI allowed local-
ization of plausible neural underpinnings of experience sharing and
mentalizing, its poor temporal resolution did not assist in deploying
processingwithin the two streams in the temporal domain so that it is
still unclear if and when a functional interplay between them occurs.
For instance, it is unclear whether this functional interplaymay occur
for verbal information (e.g., description of an accident) coherent with
an observed scene (e.g., painful face). By recording event-related
potentials (ERPs), we tested the hypothesis of temporal and func-
tional dissociations between perceptual and contextual routes of
social cognition during empathy for others’ pain. We implemented
a design in which perceptual (i.e., pictures of faces with either painful
or neutral expressions) and contextual information (i.e., sentences
describing either a painful or neutral contexts) were orthogonally
manipulated (see Figure 1). The domain of language is strictly related
to the cognitive component of social cognition and ToM3,33–37 and
strong evidence supporting this claim comes from studies on deaf
children who usually present delays in reasoning about intentions
and desires38–43. In this vein, the contextual information provided by
sentences in the present study would require high level cognitive
processing. Participants had to decide whether the face had a neutral
or a painful expression by pressing one of two response keys and they
were required to rate their subjective impression of empathy capabil-
ity for each presented context/face. Three possible neural reactions to
others’ pain were monitored: perception-based reaction (a modu-
lation of ERPs as a function of facial expressions), context-based
reaction (a modulation of ERPs as a function of verbal information),
and joint reaction (a modulation of ERPs as a function of both facial
expressions and verbal information). At least, two alternative empir-
ical scenarios were expected, supporting two distinct models.
According to a model assuming distinct neural paths of perceptual
and cognitive processing, modulations associated with the two cue
categories, either perceptual and contextual, would have been selec-
tively confined to different time windows of the ERP waveforms, i.e.,
perception-based and context-based reactions would have been dis-
sociated in time; within this empirical scenario, the complete dissoci-
ation of the two systems would manifest as additive effects of
perception-based and context-based reactions when both cues are
available (i.e., when both facial expression and context show painful
information). On the contrary, the other empirical scenario favoring
the functional interplay of the two cues and systems would have
revealed as interactive effects of them, demonstrating that contextual
information designating others’ painmay boost processing of painful
facial expressions and/or that painful facial expressionsmay enhance
processing of contextual information. The former of the two
hypothesized empirical scenarios would also provide more substan-
tial evidence in favor of a two-system model, since it would strongly
suggest that the two systems operate independently of each other,
and that neither system interacts with the other system9.
Results
Behavioral results. Reaction times (i.e., RTs) exceeding each indi-
vidual mean RT in a given condition1/2 2.5 SD and associated with
incorrect responses were excluded from all analyses.
Individual mean proportions of correct responses and RTs were
submitted to separate ANOVAs, both considering facial expression
(painful vs. neutral) and context (painful vs. neutral) as within-sub-
jects factors. The main effect of neither facial expression or of the
context approached significance level, nor did the interaction (for
mean proportions of correct responses: max F5 3.670; min p5 .071,
max gp2 5 .057; for RTsmax F5 1.296;min p5 .269,max gp2 5 .014;
see Figure 2a).
Individual scores of the participants in the rating task were also
submitted to repeated measure ANOVA considering the same fac-
tors. ANOVA showed significant effect of the interaction between
facial expression and context factors (F(1,19) 5 18.910, p 5 .000346,
MSe 5 1.095, gp2 5 .143). Post-hoc t-tests revealed that, when both
facial expressions and context were painful, participants reported
higher rates of subjective impression of empathy toward others’ pain
relative to the conditions in which only the facial expression (t 5
Figure 1 | Timeline and conditions in the present experiment.
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6.769, p 5 .000002;Mdiff 5 2.302 [1.33, 3.27]), or context (t 5 6.015,
p5 .000009;Mdiff 5 2.341 [1.23, 3.45]), or both of themwere neutral
(t5 7.653, p5 .000001;Mdiff 5 2.608 [1.63, 3.58]). Figure 2b shows a
bar chart of mean rating scores for each condition with standard
errors. Main effects of both facial expression (F(1,19) 5 42.652, p
5 .000003, MSe 5 .822, gp2 5 .241), and of context (F(1,19) 5
31.092, p 5 .000022,MSe 5 1.061, gp2 5 .227) were also significant.
ERPs. A repeated measure analyses of variance (ANOVA) of ERP
amplitudes including facial expression (painful vs. neutral) and
context (painful vs. neutral) as within-subjects factors was carried
out for each ERP time-window and electrode pool. The significant
threshold for all statistical analyses was set to .01. Because of the
complex experimental design, exact p values, mean square errors
(i.e., MSe) and effect sizes (i.e., partial eta-squared, gp2) are
reported. Confidence intervals (i.e., CIs, set at 99%) are defined
only for paired t-tests and referred to difference of means (i.e.,
Mdiff; as suggested by Cumming44). Planned comparisons relevant
to test the hypotheses of the present experiment are reported.
Figure 3a shows grand averages of ERPs locked on face onset
recorded at pooled fronto-central electrodes for each experimental
condition (i.e., neutral context/painful facial expression, painful con-
text/neutral facial expression, and painful context/painful facial
expression) superimposedwith ERPs elicited in the neutral condition
(i.e., neutral context/neutral facial expression). Analogous patterns
of ERPmodulations were observed at centro-parietal pooled electro-
des (fig. 3b). Mean amplitude values of each component were sub-
mitted to ANOVAs considering facial expression (painful vs.
neutral) and context (painful vs. neutral) as within-subjects factors,
separately for each region, i.e. fronto-central and centro-parietal
pooled electrode sites.
N1. The ANOVA of the N1 mean amplitude values revealed main
effects over none of the pooled electrode sites nor interactions
between facial expression and context (all Fs , 1).
P2. The ANOVA carried out on P2 mean amplitude values
revealed a significant main effect of facial expression at pooled
fronto-central electrodes, F(1,19) 5 8.269, p 5 .01, MSe 5 1.785,
gp
2 5 .118, indicating that painful expressions elicited larger P2
(3.419 mV, SD 5 3.179) than neutral expressions (2.559 mV, SD 5
3.217) irrespective of the context. Neither the main effect of context
nor its interaction with factors reached significance (all Fs, .1). At
centro-parietal pooled electrodes, neither the main effects of facial
expression and context nor their interaction reached significance
(max F 5 3.609; min p 5 .073; max gp2 5 .08). Planned comparisons
revealed that, at fronto-central electrode pooled sites, painful expres-
sions elicited larger P2 amplitude than neutral expressions (t 5
2.876, p 5 .01; Mdiff 5 .859 [.004, 1.71]) irrespective of the context
and that the condition in which both facial expression and context
were painful did not elicit enhanced P2 amplitude compared to the
condition in which only the face was painful (t , 1).
The results of sLORETA analysis revealed that the neural activity
in the P2 time window that differentiated between painful and non-
painful facial expressions (i.e., the perception-based reaction) was
mainly localized in the left anterior insula extending into the IFG
(Brodmann Area, BA, 47; peak Montreal Neurological Institute,
MNI, coordinates: 230, 30, 25, Fig. 3a), core regions of the limbic
and putative mirror neuron systems. This finding provides further
support to the view that this early ERP reaction to pain was a
reflection of the experience sharing component of empathy13–17,20–21.
N22N3. The ANOVAs of ERP amplitudes in the N2-N3 time
window revealed a significant main effect of facial expression at both
fronto-central pooled electrode sites, F(1,19)5 12.875, p5 .002,MSe
5 2.448, gp2 5 .211, and centro-parietal pooled electrode sites
F(1,19) 5 19.656, p 5 .0003, MSe 5 3.212, gp2 5 .319. This effect
was manifest as a positive shift of the ERP activity for painful facial
expression (at fronto-central pooled sites .865 mV, SD 5 2.7; at cen-
tro-parietal pooled sites 8.339 mV, SD 5 3.59) relative to neutral
expression (at fronto-central pooled sites -.390 mV, SD 5 2.43; at
centro-parietal pooled sites 6.563 mV, SD 5 3.56). Themain effect of
context did not reach significance at both pooled sites (fronto-central
pooled sites F(1,19) 5 1.252, p 5.277, MSe 5 2.301, gp2 5 .019;
centro-parietal pooled sites F , 1) nor did the interaction between
factors (fronto-central pooled sites F(1, 19) 5 1.945, p 5.179,MSe 5
1.164, gp2 5 .015; centro-parietal pooled sites F(1, 19) 5 1.261, p
5.275,MSe 5 1.463, gp2 5 .009). Planned comparisons revealed that
painful facial expressions elicited more positive N22N3 amplitude
than neutral facial expressions (at centro-central pooled sites: t 5
3.588, p 5 .002; Mdiff 5 1.255 [.254, 2.26]; at centro-parietal pooled
sites: t 5 4.433, p 5 .0003;Mdiff 5 1.777 [.630, 2.92]). The condition
in which both facial expression and context were painful elicited a
joint reaction that was comparable to that elicited when only the face
was painful (all ts, 1; i.e., the perception-based reaction). At centro-
parietal pooled electrode sites, the reaction elicited by the condition
in which both the face and the context were painful elicited a more
positive shift than the condition in which only the context was pain-
Figure 2 | (a) Bar charts displaying mean accuracy and mean RT for each
experimental conditions and (b) bar charts of mean rating scores for each
condition. Error bars represent standard errors. Colors of the bars relate to
colors of the ERP waveforms for corresponding conditions.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 3 | (a) Grand averages of the face-locked ERP waveforms recorded at pooled fronto-central electrode sites for each experimental condition in
comparison to the neutral condition (in black color). The perception-based reaction (i.e., reactions to painful facial expressions that were preceded by
neutral contexts; in blue color) selectively involved the earlier portion of the ERP waveforms (i.e., P2 and N22N3 components), which were significantly
more positive in response to painful relative to neutral facial expressions. The context-based reaction (i.e., reactions to neutral faces preceded by painful
contexts; in red color) selectively interested the P3, which was significantly more positive in response to painful relative to neutral contexts. The joint reaction
(i.e., reactions to painful faces preceded by painful contexts; in green color) involved the P2, N22N3 and the P3, which were significantly more positive
when both the face and the context were painful relative to the neutral condition; the joint reaction was characterized by additive effects (i.e., no interaction)
of reactions triggered by perceptual and contextual cues. The figure shows also source estimation of the P2 and N2–N3 activities in the painful vs. non-
painful facial expression conditions (perception-based reaction; the left anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus and the left inferior parietal lobule/intraparietal
sulcus, respectively) and the source estimation of the P3 activity in painful vs. non-painful conditions as a function of contextual information (context-based
reaction; the bilateral superior frontal gyri). (b) Grand averages the face-locked ERP waveforms of all conditions superimposed recorded at pooled centro-
parietal electrode sites. The N22N3 were selectively modulated by painful facial expressions, whereas the P3 was selectively modulated by painful contexts.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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ful (t 5 3.423, p 5 .003;Mdiff 5 1.473 [.242, 2.70]). At fronto-central
pooled electrode sites this comparison did not show significant
results (t 5 1.891, p 5 .074; Mdiff 5 .919 [-.471, 2.31]).
The results of sLORETA analysis revealed that the neural activity
in the N22N3 time window that differentiated between painful and
non-painful facial expressions (i.e., the perception-based reaction)
was mainly localized in the left inferior parietal lobule/intraparietal
sulcus (BA 40; peak MNI coordinates: 235, 250, 55, Fig. 3a), core
regions of the putative mirror neuron system and previously assoc-
iated with the experience sharing component of empathy13–17,20–21.
P3. The ANOVAs of the P3 amplitudes revealed a significantmain
effect of context at fronto-central pooled electrode sites, F(1,19) 5
8.504, p 5 .009, MSe 5 2.614, gp2 5 .160 (at centro-parietal pooled
sites the main effect of context did not reach the significance level of
.01, although an analogous trend was observed: F(1,19) 5 4.665, p 5
.044,MSe 5 2.705, gp2 5 .078). Painful contexts enhanced P3 ampli-
tudes related to face stimuli (fronto-central pooled sites: 3.517 mV,
SD 5 2.588) relative to those following neutral contexts (front-cent-
ral pooled sites: 2.462 mV, SD 5 2.69). Similarly, at centro-parietal
pooled sites painful vs. neutral context tended to elicit larger P3
amplitudes to face stimuli (8.144 mV, SD 5 2.38) than neutral con-
texts (7.350 mV, SD 5 2.12). The main effect of facial expression did
not reach significance (all Fs , 1) nor did the interaction between
factors (at fronto-central pooled sites: F(1,19) 53.429, p 5 .08, MSe
5 .881, gp2 5 .022; at centro-parietal pooled sites F(1,19) 5 2.483, p
5 .132, MSe 5 1.233, gp2 5 .019). A planned comparison further
confirmed that the condition in which both facial expression and
context were painful was not significantly different from the con-
dition in which only the description was painful (at both pooled sites
all ts , 1).
Figure 4 provides a schematic overview on how ERPs were modu-
lated by the presentation of each combination of cues. Mean percep-
tion-based reaction, context-based reaction and joint reaction are
represented here as the differential mean amplitude between the
ERPs elicited in the critical condition for eliciting the reaction (i.e.,
painful facial expressions/neutral contexts for the perception-based
reaction; neutral facial expressions/painful contexts for the context-
based reaction; painful facial expressions/painful contexts for the
joint reaction) and the ERPs elicited in the neutral condition (i.e.,
neutral facial expressions/neutral contexts). It is clear that the per-
ception-based reaction mainly involved the early portion of the ERP
waveforms (i.e., P2 and N2-N3 components), whereas the context-
based reaction mainly interested the later portion of the ERP wave-
forms (i.e., P3). Notably, the effect of one cuewas completely separate
from the other cue, as evident when both cues, perceptual and con-
textual, were concurrently available. The reactions triggered by these
cues (i.e., perception-based and context-based reactions) just added
up in a simple way, that is the joint reaction was characterized by
additive effects (i.e., no interaction) of the early perception-based
reaction and the late context-based reaction.
The results of sLORETA analysis revealed that the neural activity
in the P3 time window that differentiated between painful and non-
painful conditions as a function of the context (i.e., the context-based
reaction) was mainly localized in the bilateral superior frontal gyri
(BA 8; peakMNI coordinates: 13, 42, 46, Fig. 3a), a core region of the
mentalizing network12,14,16,18–21.
In order to further corroborate the evidence of a double dissoci-
ation between perception-based and context-based reactions, we
conducted an additional ANOVA including time window (P2 mean
amplitude vs. P3 mean amplitude), facial expression (painful vs.
neutral) and context (painful vs. neutral) as within-subjects factors.
Notably, both the interaction time window x facial expression and
time window x context were significant at pooled fronto-central
electrodes, F(1,19) 5 13.019, p 5 .002, MSe 5 .549, gp2 5 .407,
and F(1,19) 5 10.281, p 5 .005,MSe 5 .820, gp2 5 .351, respectively.
At centro-parietal electrodes, the interaction between time window
and context was also significant, F(1,19) 5 10.123, p 5 .005,MSe 5
.830, gp2 5 .348 (the interaction between time window and express-
ion was not significant, p 5 .298). These results further demonstrate
the dissociated effects of pain expression and painful context on the
early and late neural activities during perceiving information about
others’ pain.
Discussion
The present study showed that perceptual cues of others’ emotional
states (i.e., facial expressions; perception-based reaction) selectively
modulated ERP responses in a time-window including the P2 and the
N22N3 components, and, in line with the previous work45, such
modulation was evident as a positive shift of the ERP waveforms
when faces expressing painful expressions were displayed compared
to when faces expressing neutral expressions were displayed.
Moreover, the modulations of the P2 and N22N3 amplitudes were
independent of the context information shown before the presenta-
tion of face stimuli. This reaction appears to reflect the perceptual
component of social cognition, and within the theoretical framework
of studies on empathy, it was suggested that it is the ERP manifesta-
tion of experience sharing of others’ pain45–47. This conclusion is
further supported by the finding that the main potential sources of
these responses were the left anterior insula/inferior frontal gyrus
and the left inferior parietal lobule, regions that previous studies have
linked to the experience sharing system13–17,20–21.
The contextual cue, instead, selectively modulated a later ERP
component, i.e., the P3, such that painful contexts elicited a larger
P3 than neutral contexts (i.e., context-based reaction). The modu-
lation of the P3 amplitudes by context was independent of the emo-
tional states of the target, being similar for pain and neutral
expressions. Notably, this later effect cannot be due to the time
needed for the processing of the contextual information because of
the variable interval interleaved between it and the presentation of
the perceptual information (for further details, please see the
Methods section). This reaction very likely reflects the cognitive
component of social cognition, and the component termed ‘menta-
lizing’ in the context of the studies on empathy as also supported by
source localization11,45–47. These results, although novel, are not
necessarily surprising, as recent research in this field demonstrated
the independence of brain regions involved in experience sharing
and mentalizing, thus complementing the anatomical dissociation
with evidence of functional dissociation22. Consistent with these
findings, a meta-analysis of 200 neuroimaging studies on under-
standing of others’ action goals showed that mirror neuron and
mentalizing systems are rarely concurrently active, strongly suggest-
ing that neither system subserves the other, but they are rather com-
plementary48. However, it should be noted that the great majority of
studies investigating how we understand others’ mental states in
general, and empathy in particular, triggered almost selectively either
experience sharing or mentalizing by implementing experimental
procedures that included one or the other type of cue (perceptual
vs. cognitive/verbal49–52) dissociating a priori the possible contri-
bution of the two and preventing the interaction between them from
being disclosed.
In order to overcome such limitation, the present study orthogon-
ally manipulated both types of cues. By virtue of this procedure, the
novel, and surprising finding is that the concurrent presence of both
painful cues did not elicit magnified neural reactions to others’ pain,
that is, when both cues of pain were available, the early perception-
based reaction was not modulated by the presence of a painful con-
text nor the later context-based reaction was modulated by the pres-
ence of a face expressing pain. In brief, the joint reaction was
characterized by additive effects (i.e., no interaction) of perceptual
and contextual cues. Apparently, a single-system account cannot
explain this whole patter of findings.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first report of a double
dissociation in healthy participants of neural reactions to others’ pain
based on perceptual and contextual information, favoring amodel of
social cognition in which perceptual and cognitive components are
dissociated at both temporal and functional levels, at least when the
cognitive component is triggered by language. Importantly, when
both types of cues of others’ pain were available, the subjective
impression of empathy was doubled, exactly as expected by an addit-
ive model in which the outputs of two different systems are summed
up, suggesting that both systems may equally contribute in generat-
ing a subjective experience of empathy. Furthermore, when only one
type of cue of others’ pain was available, the subjective impression of
empathy did not significantly differ from the condition inwhich both
cues were neutral, suggesting not only that the two systems may
equally contribute, but that they are both necessary for a subjective
experience of empathy. In this vein, our findings do not invalidate
previous fMRI evidence for co-activation of the two systems during
social interaction, actions and emotion understanding24–28, but they
suggest that the observed pattern of co-activation is to be reconsid-
ered in light of the highly finer temporal resolution offered by the
ERP approach. By using this technique, our findings strongly suggest
that the two systems are triggered in different timewindows, and that
‘cooperation’ between the two is not to be intended as ‘interaction’
between them, but rather as the ‘contribution’ that they may offer to
the good functioning of the complex machine devoted to social
cognition.
Methods
Participants. Before running the present experiment, we established to enter into
ERP analyses data from 20 participants because of existing literature in this field that
suggests it is an appropriate sample45-46,53. Data were then collected from 23 volunteer
healthy students (7 males) from the University of Padova (mean age: 25 years, SD 5
3.3; two left-handed) because data from 3 participants (2 males) were discarded from
analyses due to excessive electrophysiological artifacts. All reported normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological disorders. Twenty
participants (5 males; mean age: 25 years, SD 5 3.5; one left-handed) were then
included in the final sample. All participants gave their informed consent according to
the ethical principles approved by the University of Padova.
Stimuli.The stimuli were 32 Caucasian face stimuli, 8 females and 8males with either
a neutral or painful expression45, and 32 sentences describing either a painful or
neutral situation. The sentences were comparable with regard to their syntactic
complexity, i.e., all declarations, with the same phrase structure grammars, i.e., noun
phrase (adjective and noun; i.e., ‘‘This person’’) 1 verbal phrase (verb and noun
phrase, e.g. ‘‘has got a severe toothache’’, or verb and propositional phrase, e.g., ‘‘does
yoga three times per week ’’). The face stimuli were scaled using an image-processing
software so that each face fit in 2.9u 3 3.6u (width 3 height) rectangle and the
sentences were presented on three lines at the center of the screen in a 1.73u 3 3.9u
(width 3 height) virtual rectangle from a viewing distance of approximately 70 cm.
Stimuli were presented on a 17-in cathode ray tubemonitor controlled by a computer
running E-prime software.
Experimental design. Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross at the
center of the screen (600 ms), followed by a sentence (i.e., contextual cue; 3000 ms)
describing either a neutral or a painful condition. After a blank interval (800–
1600 ms, jittered in steps of 100 ms), a face (i.e., perceptual cue) was displayed for
250 ms with either a neutral or a painful expression. The sequence of events of each
trial is depicted in Figure 1. The jittering of the blank interval between the contextual
and the perceptual cue was crucial as it avoided any possible bias due to the time
needed to process the sentence by smearing electrical activity related to the contextual
cue before presenting the face.
Participants had to decide whether the face had a neutral or a painful expression by
pressing one of two response keys. Participants were told that on each trial they would
have been presented with a sentence describing either 1) a neutral situation involving
an individual (i.e., neutral context; e.g., ‘‘This person loves playing classical guitar’’) or
2) a painful situation (i.e., painful context: ‘‘This person is undergoing a hurting
injection’’). Each sentence was followed by the picture of the individual taken in the 1)
painful condition (i.e., expressing a painful facial expression) or in 2) a different
moment (i.e., expressing a neutral facial expression).
In brief, this manipulation resulted in four combinations in which participants
knew that a painful condition would have been characterized either by a context, by a
facial expression or by both of these cues. At the end of each trial, participants were
required to rate their subjective impression of empathy capability on a 7-points Likert
scale for each presented context/face. Following a brief session of practice in order to
familiarize with the task, participants performed 320 trials (i.e., 5 blocks, 80 trials for
each combination of perceptual and contextual cues).
Electrophysiological recording and analyses. The EEG was recorded from 64 active
electrodes distributed over the scalp in accordance with the international 10/20
system placed on an elastic Acti-Cap, referenced to the left earlobe. The EEG was re-
referenced offline to the average of the left and right earlobes. Horizontal EOG (i.e.,
HEOG) was recorded bipolarly from two external electrodes positioned laterally to
the left and right external canthi. Vertical EOG (i.e., VEOG) was recorded from Fp1
and one external electrode placed below the left eye. The electrode impedance was
kept less than 10 KV because of the highly viscous electro-gel and the properties of
active electrodes.
EEG, HEOG and VEOG signals were amplified (pass band 0.01–80 Hz) and
digitized at a sampling rate of 250 Hz. The EEG was segmented into 1200-ms epochs
starting 100 ms prior to the onset of the faces. The epochs were baseline-corrected
based on the mean activity during the 100-ms pre-stimulus period, for each electrode
site. Trials associated with incorrect responses or contaminated by large horizontal
eye movements, eye blinks or other artifacts (exceeding 6 30 mV, 6 60 mV and 6
80 mV, respectively) were discarded from analysis, which accounted for the exclusion
Figure 4 | Mean perception-based reaction, context-based reaction and joint reaction for each ERP temporal window at pooled fronto-central
electrode sites (the left bar chart) and centro-parietal electrode sites (the right bar chart) computed as differential mean amplitudes between the critical
condition for eliciting each reaction and the ERP elicited in the neutral condition. Error bars represent standard errors.
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of an average of 6% of trials. Separate average waveforms for each condition were then
generated time-locked to the presentation of the face stimuli. Statistical analyses of
ERPs mean amplitudes focused on N1 (90–100 ms), P2 (110–180 ms), N22N3
(200–360 ms) and P3 (400–840 ms). The time window between 200 and 360 ms was
labeled N22N3 relating to a previous study47. Mean ERPs amplitude values were
measured at pooled electrode sites selected from fronto-central (Fz, F1, F2, F3, F4, F5,
F6, FCz, FC1, FC2, FC3, FC4, FC5, FC6) and centro-parietal (CPz, CP1, CP2, CP3,
CP4, CP5, CP6, Pz, P1, P2, P3, P4, P5, P6) electrodes according to visual inspection
and previous work46–47. ERP reactions to others’ pain are known to manifest as
positive shifts of the ERP waveforms in trials related to pain (e.g., painful facial
expressions, painful stimulations applied to body parts of other people) compared to
trials in which neutral conditions with regard to pain are displayed (i.e., neutral facial
expressions, neutral stimulations applied to body parts of other people)46–47,53–55.
As expounded in the Introduction, we monitored the perception-based reaction (a
positive shift elicited by painful facial expressions compared to the condition in which
both facial expressions and contexts were neutral), the context-based reaction (a
positive shift elicited by contexts describing painful situations compared to the
condition in which both facial expressions and contexts were neutral), and the joint
reaction (a positive shift elicited by the condition in which both the facial expression
and the context were painful compared to the condition in which both of them were
neutral).
The standardized Low Resolution Brain Electromagnetic Tomography
(sLORETA)56 was used for brain localization of the potential sources of ERP reac-
tions. sLORETA extrapolates 3D statistical maps from EEG data of the possible
sources of scalp-recorded ERP components. Using sLORETA, 3D maps and stereo-
taxic information about current density source of neural activity modulated by the
painful vs. non-painful manipulation were derived from the present EEG dataset. The
analysis was conducted following the creation of a boundary element method (BEM)
model, including cortical and skin, with about 5000 nodes from magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) data, the selection of a temporal window in which ERP responses
differentiated between painful and non-painful conditions, and a location-wise
inverse weighting from the Minimum Norm Least Square (MNLS) analysis with
estimated variances.
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